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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF THE PERSON OF:
JESS C. MATEY,
AN INCAPACITATED PERSON.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE,

)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 34483

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,
,.

v.

... . .,.

1
JESS C. MATEY, an incapacitated person,

)

1

Defendant,
and
CHRIS J. and PAM S. MATEY,

1

Real Parties in Interest--.

)

6wcai=+~'8' )

Appeal from Fifih Judicial District for Blaine County
Honorable Robert J. Elgee, presiding
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Robyn M. Brody, ISB No. 5678
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS, Chtd.
133 Shoshone Street North
PO Box 389
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303
(208) 734-75 10
Attorneys for PetitionerIAppellee

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH ISB No. 231 1
Chief Human Services Division
Margaret P. White, ISB No. 2173
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
(208) 332-7961
Attorney for Appellant
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I. ANALYSIS.

1.

Introduction.

Since the date of Jess Matey's injury, he has received over $181,661.90 in
Medicaid benefits.

He has also received at least $1.25 million from the alleged

tortfeasor, andlor his insurer, but he will not reimburse Medicaid for the medical services
paid for by Medicaid while he was suing for his damages.' While he was inundated with
medical bills and had little or no resources with which to pay them, the Department paid
them for him, and now that he is a millionaire, he has reneged on his promise to repay the
loan. The taxpayers of the United States and Idaho have been paying his medical bills,
and will continue to pay them until he no longer requires medical services. He has said,
through his attomey, that he is willing to "reimburse" Medicaid .3 cents for every dollar
the Department gave hiin to pay medical bills. His position is based on a
misunderstanding of federal case law by Counsel and by the lower court

-

a

misunderstanding that should not be accepted by this Court.
2.

Medicaid's Position is Identical to that of Matey.

It is important to note it is not a mistake on the part of the Department that it has
not wanted to take a position adversarial to Matey regarding the amount of damages.
(See page 5, Respondent's Brief.) Because the gross damages have nothing to do with
the Supreme Court's decision in Ahlborn, the amount of gross damages does not need to
be attacked. Simply put, the Medicaid reimbursement comes out of medical expenses.
Allocation of damages, not gross damages, is important to the reimbursement equation.
There was no reason to attack the gross damages.

'

$60,752.54 (Prior to deducting the Department's share of attomey fees and costs),

Appellant's Reply Brief - 1

11. ATTORNEY'S FEES.

This is a case of first impression in Idaho, as elsewhere, as discussed in a recent
Eighth Circuit case, and is not taken frivolously:
Even the law of the Eighth Circuit was not clearly established until
the Ahlbom decision. First, in Ahlbom, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court's decision, which had found Arkansas could assert a lien
against the entirety of plaintiffs settlement. See Ahlbom v. Arkansas
Deoartment of Human Services, 280 F.Supp.2d 881, 888 (E.D.Ark.2003).
The district court noted that only one case, Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of
Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002), supported Ahlbom's position,
while Wallace v. Estate of Jackson, 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998), and
Wilsonv. State, 10 P.3d 1061 (Wash. 2000), resolved the statutory
ambiguity by finding that "once a Medicaid recipient assigns his cause of
action [he] no longer has any interest in the property (his or her cause of
action against third parties) to the extent of the state's expenditures." See
Ahlbom, 280 F.Supp.2d at 885-86. Moreover, the district court, the Eighth
Circuit, and the Supreme Court all recognized that two decisions by the
Departmental Appeals Board of the Department of Health and Human
Services supported Arkansas' position that "the federal government can
require States to attempt to recover from third-party payments beyond
those made for medical care." Ahlbom, 397 F.3d at 626 (citing Wash.
State Dep't of Soc. &Health Sews., D.A.B. No. 1561, 1996 WL 157123
(HHS Feb. 7, 1996); Calif: Dep't ofHealth Sews., D.A.B. No. 1504, 1995
WL 66334 (HHS Jan. 5, 1995)); see also Ahlbom, 547 U.S. at 289-90
(discussing HHS decisions); Ahlbom, 280 F.Supp.2d at 887 ("The
Secretary has consistently adopted the position urged by Defendants,
taking the position that States must require, as a condition of eligibility,
that recipients assign to the State their right to recover from third parties
and that, from any such recovery, the State must recover the full amount
of benefits paid on behalf of the recipient."). Thus, as demonstrated
conclusively by the Ahlbom line of cases, there were divergent opinions
on States' ability to recover the full amount of Medicaid benefits. Given
that prior to Ahlbom there was no Supreme Court, Missouri or Eighth
Circuit case that had yet decided the issue, the Court cannot say
Defendants' decision was obiectivelv
unreasonable under the
.
circumstances. Doran \? Missou~.D_e~artment
of Social Services, 2008
WI. 1 1 1290 (W.D. Mo.), Med & Mcd GD (CCH)P302,309.
The Department is not asking for attorney fees or costs in this matter.
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111. "IMPLIED OVERTURN" OF DAVIS AND STATUTE.
"The report of my death was an exaggeration." Mark Twain, New York Journal,
June 2, 1897. Reports of the demise of Davis v. Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare, Idaho Code

5

56-209b and Idaho Code

5 68-1405(4) are equally exaggerated.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 9). Idaho case law and statutes are compatible with Ahlborn.
The decision in Ahlborn is very narrow: Medicaid expenses must be reimbursed from
that portion of a settlement that is allocated, or reasonably should be allocated to medical
expenses. The amount actually allocated to medical expenses is a matter for state law;
says that if the settlement is unallocated, it is presumed that it all represents
reimbursement of medical expenses. But if it & allocated, medical reimbursement is
made from the medical expenses allocation and Idaho has priority over it. Ahlborn at

Idaho Code 5 56-209b says the same thing:
If a settlement or judgment is received by the recipient without
delineating what portion of the settlement or judgment is in payment of
medical expenses, it will be presumed that the settlement or iudment
applies first to the medical expenses incurred bv the recipient in an amount
equal to the exvenditure for medical assistance benefits vaid by the
department as a result of the occurrence giving rise to the payment or
payments to the recipient. (Emphasis added.)
All that Idaho Code

5

68-1405 says is that whatever the amount allocated to

medical expense, the Department of Health and Welfare is reimbursed before any money
can go to the recipient's Special Needs Trust.
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IV. ARGUMENT.
1.

Background.
It is undisputed that federal law requires states "to ascertain the legal liability of

. . . to

third parties

pay for care and services available under the plan" and "seek

reimbursement for such [medical] assistance to the extent of such legal liability."
42 U.S.C.

5s 1396a(a)(25)(A), (B).

As part of these requirements, States must obtain an

assignment of rights to payment for medical care from Medicaid recipients as a condition
of eligibility. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396k. However, this assignment statute "requires only
that the State recover payments from third parties to the extent of their legal liability to
compensate the beneficiary for medical care and sewices incurred by the beneficiary."
Ahlborn v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 397 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir.2005),
affd 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
Moreover, 42 U.S.C.

5

1396p(a)(l), the Federal "anti-lien" statute, prohibits "the

imposition of a lien 'against the property of an individual prior to his death on account of
medical assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State plan[.]"' Ahlborn at
623 (citing

5

1396p(a)(l)). This statute "generally prevents a State from attaching

property of a recipient to reimburse the State for benefits paid under a state Medicaid
plan." Ahlborn at 623. Under Idaho law, the Department shall have a priority to any
amount received from a third party or entity which can reasonably be construed to
compensate the recipient for the occurrence giving rise to the need for medical
assistance. . ." Idaho Code 5 56-209b(5).
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2.

Ahlborn case.

Historically, the Department interpreted the federal statutes to allow
reimbursement of the Medicaid lien from the entire settlement. Medicaid was reimbursed
100% even if there was nothing left to reimburse the Medicaid recipient for his medical
expenses.
This interpretation of the federal statutes was rejected recently by the U.S.
Supreme Court and the statutes clarified for us in Arkansas Department of Health and
Human Services v. Ahlbom, 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006).
However, the

issue before the Court in Ahlborn was whether or not the state

could . . . "lay claim to more than the portion of Ahlbom's settlement that represents
medical expenses. The text of the federal third-party liability provisions suggests not; it
focuses on recovery of payments for medical care.

Medicaid recipients must, as a

condition of eligibility, 'assign the State any rights ... to payment,for medical care from
any third party,"' 42 U.S.C.

5

1396k(a)(l)(A) (emphasis added), not rights to payment

for, as an example, lost wages. Ahlbom at 1760.
Now, when a Medicaid recipient obtains a tort settlement following payment of
medical costs on his behalf by Medicaid, the federal Medicaid law's anti-lien provision,
42 U.S.C.

5

1396p(a)(l), prohibits Idaho from imposing a lien on proceeds meant to

compensate the recipient for damages distinct from medical costs. 42 U.S.C.

5

1396k(a)(l)(A). The anti-lien provision precludes attachment or encumbrance of any

portion of the settlement that does not represent payment for medical expenses.
42 U.S.C.

5 1396a(a)(25)(H).
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3.

Reimbursement.

The Department has not attempted to satisfy its lien in the instant case from any
other part of the settlement than that portion represented, or reasonably could represent
re-payment by the tortfeasor, or his insurance company, for medical expenses. "... [Tlhe
Department is saying even if you accept the arguments-the

allocation that the Mateys

have presented, it's still there that there's enough available that are allocated toward
medical expenses to pay the Department." Transcript of hearing held on September 26,
2006, p. 26, lines 15-18.
The Department has also argued from the very beginning that if there is enough
money in the settlement's "medical expense" allocation to satisfy the reimbursement
amount, no "prorating" is necessary. There is enough money allocated to medical
expenses in this matter to pay Medicaid the entire amount expended for Matey as of the
day the Special Needs Trust was created.
The most recent calculations by Matey demonstrate the validity of this statement.
Matey adinits that $406,315.28 was allocated to past medical expenses alone, and that
another $16,288,637.00 was allocated to future medical expenses. Respondent's Brief
pp. 4-5.
4.

Gross Damages vs. Medical Expenses.

Matey insists that because the Department did not challenge his alleged total
damages, it somehow waived its right to reimbursement. The argument is that because
the Department did not disagree with his estimation of gross damages, it was entitled to
only a fraction of a percent of reimbursement pursuant to Ahlborn. Respondent's Brief
pp. 4-5. It has been, and continues to be, the Department's position that gross damages
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have absolutely nothing to do with the amount of money available to reimburse
Medicaid. It is the amount of the damages that are allocated to "medical expenses" that
is controlling, not gross damages.
Nowhere in Ahlbom can Matey find anything that substantiates this insistence on
using the amount of the gross damages to calculate the percentage of reimbursement of
the Medicaid agency. There are no specific references to support Matey's argument to be
found in Ahlbom.
V. CONCLUSION.

Federal law prohibits the Department from reimbursement from that portion of
the judgment or settlement that represents pain and suffering and other non-medical
expenses. If the remainder of the settlement (that allocated to medical expenses) is
enough, the benefits provided by Medicaid as of the creation of the Special Needs Tmst
must be reimbursed.
Matey maintains that the Department is in violation of Ahlbom, but cannot point
to any language or mandate that it has not followed. Just asserting the Department has
violated the federal law does not make it so.
The Department respectfully submits this matter to the Court and requests that the
lower court's decisions be overruled.
Respectfully submitted this 110

day of July, 2008.

Deputy#ttomey
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